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FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT: TRADITIONAL
VS. ESSENTIAL STATE FUNCTIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUTER
TRANSIT SYSTEMS
In recent years many state and local governments have purchased
transit companies to provide urban commuter services to residents.' If
such a governmentally owned commuter-rail system provides no
freight services, the system is exempt from the coverage of the Railway
Labor Act (RLA)2 under the exemption for "street, interurban, or sub-
urban electric railway[s]. ' '3 In some instances, however, the state or
local government continues to provide both the commuter and the
freight services of the newly acquired company. In formulating their
labor policies, these governments must determine whether their status
as employers is governed by the RLA, which covers allinterstate carri-
ers,4 or by the National Labor Relations Act,5 which specifically ex-
empts "any State or political subdivision thereof' from coverage.6
Despite Congress's concern with preserving employee rights under
preexisting contracts, 7 state governments operating newly acquired sys-
tems have often asserted that their governmental status entitles them to
subordinate employee rights to state or local policy.8 Relying on the
1. See generally K. JENNINGS, JR., J. SMITH, JR. & E. TRAY-Am, JR., LABOR RELATIONS IN
A PUBLIC SERVICE INDUSTRY: UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN MASS
TRANSIT (1978); Barnum, From Private to Public: Labor Relations in Urban Transit, 25 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REv. 95 (1971); Hall, Hert, Sickles & Walsh, Collective Bargaining Considerations at the
Time oPublc Acquisition of a Private Transit Company, 2 TRANSIT L. REV. 5 (1981). Professor
Barnum postulates that the deteriorating position of private transit companies, declining pa-
tronage, and increasing expenses have caused the shift from private to public ownership. Barnum,
supra, at 99.
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
3. Id. § 151.
4. Id
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
6. Id. § 152(2).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, 28-29, reprintedin [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2569, 2583-85, 2595-97.
8. See, eg., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mun.
Transit Util, 585 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1978); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas
City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. 3154
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979); City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Staten
1000 DUKE LAW JOUR4L [Vol. 1981:999
Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,9 state
and local governments often assert that their operation of a local com-
muter system is exempt from congressional legislation enacted pursu-
ant to the commerce power.' 0
Judicial confusion exists over the limits of Usery. Two shortcom-
ings of Justice Rehmquist's opinion foster this confusion: his failure to
define "integral governmental functions"" and his use of a number of
Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. IBEW Local 922, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773,
appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
9. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10. See, eg., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit
Operating Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. 3154 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979); Staten Island Rapid Transit Oper-
ating Auth. v. IBEW Local 922, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773, appealdenied, 42 N.Y.2d 804,
397 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977). See also City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F.
Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
11. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976). Rather than attempt to
formulate a definition for an integral governmental function, Justice Rehnquist listed several state
services that he deemed immune from federal legislation under the commerce clause: "such areas
as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation." Id. at
851. By overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), the Court implied that hospitals,
schools for the handicapped, elementary and secondary schools, and institutions for higher educa-
tion would also be protected. See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (6th
Cir. 1979). In Usery, the Court noted, however, that "[t]hese examples are obviously not an ex-
haustive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well within the area of
traditional operations of state and local governments." 426 U.S. at 851 n.16.
One commentator has argued that the litany of terms used by Justice Rehnquist to describe
those areas immune from congressional legislation compounds the confusion surrounding the def-
inition of an "essential" (integral) state function. Note, National League of Cities Crashes on
Takeoff. Balancing Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEo. L.J. 827, 836 n.60 (1980). This litany
includes "'functions essential to separate and independent existence,'" 426 U.S. at 845 (citation
omitted); "those governmental services which their citizens require," id at 847; "traditional ways
in which the local governments have arranged their affairs," id at 849; and "functions. . .which
governments are created to provide, services ... which the States have traditionally afforded their
citizens." Id at 851.
In order to aid the interpretation of what constitutes an integral state function, the United
States Department of Labor has listed eight functions of a state or political subdivision that the
Department does not consider integral:
1. Alcoholic beverage stores,
2. Off-track betting corporations,
3. Local mass transit systems,
4. Generation and distribution of electric power,
5. Provision of residential and commercial telephone and telegraphic communication,
6. Production and sale of organic fertilizer as a by-product of sewage processing,
7. Production, cultivation, growing or harvesting of agricultural commodities for sale
to consumers, and
8. Repair and maintenance of boats and marine engines for the general public.
29 C.F.R. § 775.3 (1981) (effective dates omitted) (emphasis added).
See also Fox, Federal Public Sector Labor Relations Legislation. The Aftermath of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 115-16 (1977) (by failing to confront the notion
of state sovereignty, the Court failed to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the relation-
ship between the national government, state governments, and the people); Matsumoto, National
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terms to describe these functions. In determining the nature of an inte-
gral state function, Justice Rehnquist cited to cases that distinguished
between governmental and proprietary state functions and held that
Congress could not exercise the commerce power "to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions."12
Judicial' 3 criticisms of the governmental-proprietary distinction
and professional 4 criticisms of Usery indicate that the Court's failure
to define these functions precisely has led to uncertainty in applying the
concepts underlying the Usery decision. The Court's failure stems
from trying to accommodate two conflicting goals. First, the Court has
used the distinction to try to preserve an active role for state and local
governments in a federal system,' 5 thereby allowing these governments
to provide the services that their citizens demand without unwarranted
federal interference.' 6  Second, the Court has used the test to allow
League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding--State Immunityfrom Commerce Clause Regulation,
1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 35, 72-76 (meaning of "traditional" (integral) state function uncertain); Note,
State Sovereignty and the Commerce Power-State Employees Exempt from Federal Minimum
Wage Law: National League of Cities v. Usery, 9 CONN. L. REV. 691, 696-97 (1977) (Usery
provides no meaningful guidelines to determine which state functions are integral); Note, The
Essential GovernmentalFunction/1fter National League of Cities: Impact ofan Essentiality Test on
Commuter Rail Transportation, 9 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 149 (1980) (Court did not satisfactorily
delineate essential (integral) state functions from other governmental activities); Comment, Consti-
tutional Law-Commerce Power Limited to Preserve States' Role in the Federal System, 30
RuTGERS L. REv. 152, 168-69 (1976) (lack of clarity of Usery standard will hinder application);
Note, National League of Cities v. Usery: A New Approach to State Sovereignty?, 48 U. COLO. L.
REV. 467, 476 (1977) (Usery provides no standard to resolve conflicts between state and national
power); 25 EMoRY L.J. 937, 954 (1976) (indefiniteness of standard may lead Court to apply law
"capriciously").
12. 426 U.S. at 852. Justice Rehnquist contrasted traditional state functions with the proprie-
tary operation of a railroad in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Such an activity
"was not in an area that the States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities.
It was, on the contrary, the operation of a railroad engaged in 'common carriage by rail in inter-
state commerce....' " 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
13. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 297 n.ll (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.); id at 586 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
14. See, eg., Bogen, Usery Limits on Natural Interest, 22 ARiz. L. REv. 753 (1980);
Michelman, States'Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The
Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115 (1978); Tribe, Un-
raveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Gov-
ernment Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977). See generally Wells & Hellerstein, The
Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073 (1980).
15. See generally Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 1075-78, 1080-85 (distinction aids
accommodation of federal interests in taxation or regulation and states' interest in immunity).
16. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 591 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[w]hat might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension
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Congress to legislate in areas that require comprehensive treatment
without state and local interference. 17
This comment first discusses the problem confronted in Usery: de-
termining which state activities are immune from federal regulation.
Drawing support from cases involving intergovernmental immunity in
the tax and antitrust fields, the comment proposes an analytical frame-
work that explains Usery. The framework first divides governmental
functions into two classes: traditional functions, defined as those serv-
ices provided by states in 1787,18 the year the Constitution was drafted,
and essential functions, defined as those services that state and local
governments have undertaken since 1787 to meet their citizens' expec-
tations. 19 The analysis then requires a balancing of the asserted state
and federal interests.20 Under this part of the framework the federal
government must overcome a heavy burden before applying its legisla-
tion to traditional functions. If the service is essential, however, state
governments must show a demonstrably greater interest in providing
the service without federal interference than the federal interest in reg-
ulating the service to prove undue federal interference with the activity.
Finally, the comment argues that the federal interests in urban mass
transit and in a comprehensive labor scheme do not unduly interfere
with the essential state function of providing commuter and freight rail
service and therefore that the RLA preempts the application of con-
trary state and local law.
I. THE PROBLEM AFTER NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V USERY:
DEFINING STATE FUNCTIONS THAT ARE IMMUNE FROM
FEDERAL REGULATION
In National League of Cities v. Usery2l the Supreme Court de-
of state activities may today be deemed indispensible"); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d
1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) ("the terms 'traditional' or 'integral' are to be given a meaning permit-
ting expansion to meet changing times"). See generally Michelman, supra note 14, at 1173-80.
17. See, ag., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936). See
also Mississippi v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, No. J79-0212(C) (S.D. Miss., Feb. 19,
1981), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3077 (1981). In this case the district court addressed the analogous
issue of whether Congress may supplement and modify state regulation of intrastate public utili-
ties. The question differs from that discussed in this comment in that it focuses on the power of
the federal government to regulate a private industry historically regulated by the state through
state regulatory apparatus. This comment concerns the extent of the federal government's power
to regulate the state as a provider of services.
18. See note 136 infra and accompanying text.
19. See note 138 infra and accompanying text.
20. See note 136-39 infra and accompanying text.
21. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
1002 [Vol. 1981:999
Vol. 1981:999] FEDERAL PREEMPTION 1003
clared the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 22
unconstitutional. These amendments had extended minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions to employees of state and local govern-
ments.23 The cities and states successfully argued that this legislation
violated "an affirmative limitation on the exercise of [congressional]
power akin to other commerce power affirmative limitations contained
in the Constitution." 24 Writing for the plurality,25 Justice Rehnquist
analogized to cases involving state immunity from the federal tax
power and held that certain state functions lay beyond the scope of the
commerce power.26 Although employment conditions of state and lo-
cal government employees affect interstate commerce,27 the Court held
that Congress may not act to "directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions. '28 This limitation derives from the tenth amendment and the
nature of a federal system.29
Justice Rehnquisfs plurality opinion indicates that a judicial de-
termination of whether a congressional statute interferes with a "tradi-
tional governmental function" is the most important step in the
inquiry. To Justice Rehnquist the only issue was whether Congress, in
enacting the FLSA amendments, had breached the affirmative doctrine
of inter-governmental immunity.30 Finding such a breach, Justice
Rehnquist held the amendments unconstitutional.31 Concurring in the
22. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1974 Supp. IV).
23. Id.; 426 U.S. at 836.
24. 426 U.S. at 841. Justice Rehnquist also stated that the Court's previous decisions recog-
nized "that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not
be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative au-
thority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner." Id at 845.
25. Justices Stewart and Powell and Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
Justice Blackmun concurred separately. Id. at 856. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices
white and Marshall. Id. Justice Stevens dissented separately. Id. at 880.
26. Id at 843 (citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)); 426 U.S. at 844 (citing
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926)). See notes 110-35 infra and accompanying text.
27. 426 U.S. at 848-49.
28. Id at 852.
29. Id. at 842-44. U.S. Co~sT. amend. X provides that: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) the Court
stated: "The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effec-
tively in a federal system."
30. 426 U.S. at 841.
31. "Congress has attempted to exercise its commerce clause authority to prescribe minimum
wages and maximum hours to be paid by states in their capacities as sovereign governments. In so
doing, Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to
function effectively in a federal system." Id. at 852.
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result, Justice Blackmun specifically adopted a balancing approach that
permits federal regulation of traditional state functions "where the fed-
eral interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compliance
...would be essential. '32  He concurred with the plurality because he
believed that they implicitly adopted a balancing approach. 33
Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Usery of two previous commerce
power cases suggests that the plurality did implicitly adopt a balancing
approach. In Fry v. United States34 the Court had upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA),35 which lim-
ited wage increases granted to state and local government employees.
Writing for the Fry majority, Justice Marshall had stated that the Act's
language and legislative history implied that Congress intended the Act
to apply to all employees.36 In reaffirming Fry in the Usery opinion,
Justice Rehnquist distinguished the ESA from the 1974 FLSA amend-
ments by noting that the ESA was an emergency measure intended to
solve a national problem.3 7 Significantly, Justice Rehnquist had dis-
sented in Fry, reasoning that the ESA affected the states' constitutional
right "inherent in [their] capacity as State[s], to be free from such con-
gressionally asserted authority."38
A balancing approach also explains the Usery Court's overruling
of Maryland v. Wirtz. 39 In Wirtz the Court had upheld the constitu-
tionality of the 1966 FLSA amendments, which had extended the Act's
coverage to state-operated hospitals, elementary and secondary schools,
and institutions of higher learning.4n The Usery plurality recognized a
32. Id at 856.
33. Id.
34. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
35. Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 799.
36. 421 U.S. at 545-48. The Act made no exceptions for any federal or state governmental
employees. Id at 546. Justice Marshall noted: "laIn framing the Act, Congress specifically re-
jected an amendment that would have exempted employees of state and local governments. 117
CONG. REc. 43,673-77 (1971). And the Senate Committee Report makes it plain that the Commit-
tee considered and rejected a proposed exemption for the same group. S. REP. No. 92-507, p. 4
(1971)." 421 U.S. at 546. He also noted that state employees constituted fourteen percent of the
nation's work force. If the Court had exempted state employees from coverage, "the effectiveness
of federal action would have been drastically impaired." Id at 548.
37. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976). Justice Rehnquist empha-
sized that "[t]he means selected [in the Economic Stabilization Act] were carefully drafted so as
not to interfere with the States' freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time." Id Jus-
tice Rehnquist then argued that the across-the-board freeze authorized by the Act did not displace
state policy choices in the same way that the 1974 FLSA amendments did. Id
38. 421 U.S. at 553.
39. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 203d (1976). In Wirtz the Court stated that "the Federal Government, when
acting within a delegated power, may override state interests whether these be described as 'gov-
ernmental' or 'proprietary' in character." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968). The Court
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distinction between hospital or school employees and other govern-
mental personnel,4' but implicitly found that no overriding federal con-
cern warranted blanket coverage of these state functions.42
Two problems have confronted courts43 and commentators"4 at-
tempting to analyze Usery: Justice Rehnquist's failure to provide a
clear definition of an integral state function, and his refusal to recog-
nize explicitly the role that the asserted federal interest plays in the
analysis. These shortcomings have led to particularly divergent analy-
ses when courts have attempted to determine whether the RLA
preempts state labor legislation where a state or local government pro-
vides both freight and commuter-rail services to its citizens.
II. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL
RAILROAD STATUTES TO STATE-OPERATED
COMMUTER LINES
Generally, courts faced with a conflict between the RLA and state
statutes have disagreed in the first instance whether a balancing test is
appropriate in deciding which statute to apply. Even those courts that
agree that a balancing test is appropriate have differed on the consider-
ation to be accorded the impact of the commuter-freight system on in-
terstate commerce.
45
refused to "carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on
commerce from private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run by the
States for the benefit of their citizens." Id at 198-99. Justices Douglas and Stewart dissented on
the grounds that the FLSA amendments were "pervasive, striking at all levels of state govern-
ment," disrupted state fiscal policy, and threatened their autonomy in the regulation of health and
education. Id at 202-03.
41. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
42. Id. at 853-54.
43. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979);
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552
F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880
(S.D. Ga. 1981).
44. See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 14, at 763-71; Matsumoto, supra note 11, at 71 n.193 (plural-
ity opinion rejects balancing approach); Michelman, supra note 14, at 1173-81 ("essential" status
conferred by the acts of the electorate); Tribe, supra note 14, at 1072-80; Tushnet, Constitutional
and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1301, 1338, 1340
(1978).
45. Compare United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert
granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981) and Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. IBEW Local
922, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773, appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977) with United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300
(E.D.N.Y.),rev'd 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981) and Brotherhood
of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. 3154
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979).
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In Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority (SIRTOA) v.
IBEW, Local 922,46 SIRTOA operated a single-line commuter railway
and a limited freight service.47 The employees of SIRTOA argued that
the RLA preempted New York's Taylor Law, which prohibits strikes
by public employees, 48 and that the state court therefore could not ap-
ply that law to enjoin a strike.49 In rejecting the employees' contention,
the court held that the operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is
not a state function protected from congressional regulation by princi-
ples of state sovereignty.50 The court determined, however, that
SIRTOA was "essentially an intrastate passenger or commuter opera-
tion" and was not operating a railroad as a common carrier.5 1 Ignoring
the federal interests in commuter transportation52 and comprehensive
labor legislation,53 the court concluded that the state's interest in
preventing strikes by public employees and in providing rail service to
commuters was greater than any federal interest arising from
SIRTOA's "minimal and tenuous connection to interstate
commerce."
54
Another court, however, has applied the RLA despite the limited
46. 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773, appealdenied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
47. At one time... the Staten Island railway line was truly a part of an interstate
system. At the time of the city's acquisition, the connection between the railway and
interstate commerce had dwindled to the operation of one freight train per day over this
trackage. Continuation of this service was a condition of the city's takeover.
57 A.D.2d at 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
48. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973). See generally Douglas, The Labor Injunc.
tion:t Enjoining Public Sector Strikes in New York, 31 LAB. L.J. 340 (1980) (summarizing the pro-
visions and the effects of the Taylor Law).
49. 57 A.D.2d at 614-15, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
50. Id at 615, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
854 n.18 (1976)).
51. Citing California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (discussed at notes 93-96 infra and ac-
companying text), the court noted that "[t]here is no doubt that when a state or one of its political
subdivisions owns and operates a railroad which is directly engaged in interstate commerce, it
thereby subjects itself to the commerce power and that Congress can regulate its employment
relationships." 57 A.D.2d at 615, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775. "SIRTOA's operation is in no way compa-
rable to the State-owned switching or terminal railroads held subject to Federal jurisdiction
." Id. at 615-16, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775. The court also emphasized that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had recognized the tenuous connection between SIRTOA and interstate com-
merce by exempting SIRTOA from various provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Id at 616,
393 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
52. See notes 191-94 infra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 195-210 infra and accompanying text. The court noted that SIRTOA's employ-
ees came within the literal coverage of the RLA. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
SIRTOA's labor dispute did not present problems of national or regional magnitude. 57 A.D.2d
at 616, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
54. Id at 616, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
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nature of SIRTOA's one-train freight operation 5 In Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Author-
ity 56 a federal district court held that the RLA preempts contrary state
provisions under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution 57
and that therefore SIRTOA could not invoke the Taylor Law.5 8 The
court did not discuss the state's alleged significant interest in curtailing
public employee strikes or the tenuous connection between SIRTOA
and interstate commerce.59 In refusing to grant SIRTOA the injunc-
tion, the court emphasized that the RLA was a comprehensive effort to
stabilize employment relationships in an important national industry.60
In United Transportation Union (UTU) v. Long Island Railroad
(LIRR)61 a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
joined employees of New York's Metropolitan Transportation Author-
ity (MTA) from engaging in self-help under the RLA. Like SIRTOA,
the MTA had acquired its rail line from a private company.6 2 The
MTA operated the line both as a commuter system and as an interstate
carrier, handling from 800 to 1000 freight cars per week.63 The MTA
assumed that the RLA covered its operations and took specific action
to curtail employee rights: faced with the possibility of a strike, the
MTA converted the LIRR from a private stock corporation to a public
benefit corporation in order to enjoin the strike under the Taylor
55. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
56. 100 L.R.R.M. 3154 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979).
57. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
58. Butsee Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. IBEW Local 922, 57 A.D.2d 614,
616, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 934 (1977).
59. 100 L.R.R.M. at 3160-61. "Not a single authority has been cited to this court which even
suggests that we should engage in a quantitative analysis, debilitating the Act in some proportion-
ate measure as the connection with interstate commerce decreases." Id.
60. Id. at 3158-60. "While we recognize the strong local interest in maintaining the operation
of a railway system such as SIRTOA, we reject the assertion that such interest validates an un-
questionable abridgement of federally guaranteed rights." Id at 3159. The court also noted that
"none of the [labor] preemption cases... stand for the proposition that conduct... at the core
of. . . federal [labor] legislation must give way to contrary local regulation." Id at 3160 n.8
(citations omitted). See notes 195-210 infra and accompanying text.
61. 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981).
62. 634 F.2d at 20.
63. Id. at 20. The court emphasized, however, that the revenue from freight operations, $12.1
million in 1979, constituted only a small portion of the estimated $300 million income. Id at 20-
21. The panel concluded that the LIRR was essentially a local commuter transit system exempt
from the RLA. Id at 20.
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Law.64 In reversing the district court,65 the panel held that the RLA
impaired "the State's ability to structure employer-employee relation-
ships in its role as sole provider of an essential public service."'66
Applying a balancing test,67 the panel conceded that the LIRR was
facially subject to the RLA.68 The panel, however, focused on the pur-
pose of the Taylor Law69 and emphasized the state's interest in provid-
ing commuter rail service. 70 Relying on Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in Usery,7' the panel concluded that the union had failed
to present a "demonstrably greater" federal interest and that the state
was entitled to an injunction under the Taylor Law.72
The courts' divergent analyses make generalizations difficult.
Given the Supreme Court's historically broad view of interstate com-
64. Id at 21.
65. Id at 20. The district court attached importance to the MTA's conversion of the LIRR
into a "public benefit subsidiary corporation" specifically in order to subject the employees to the
Taylor Law. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd 634
F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981). Noting that the LIRR was the only
common carrier serving numerous industries and the traveling public in Nassau and Suffolk coun-
ties, id at 1304, Judge Mishler held that a balancing test was not appropriate:
'Whether the source of this right be found in a particular provision of the Railway Labor
Act or in the scheme as a whole, it is integral to the Act. State courts may not enjoin a
peaceful strike by covered railway employees, no matter how economically harmful the
consequences may be.'
Id at 1305 (quoting Brotherhood of K.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
384-85 (1969)).
66. 634 F.2d at 20.
67. Id at 23-24, 29-30. The court failed to note, however, the comprehensiveness of the
federal labor scheme in general and of the RLA in particular.
68. Id at 22-23. The court also noted that the LIRR's freight service provides a crucial
physical link with other interstate rail carriers. Historically, the LIRR had always considered
itself a carrier within the meaning of the RLA and had consistently filed reports required by the
Interstate Commerce Act. Moreover, the employees receive benefits under the Railroad Retire-
ment Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Federal Employees Liability Act.
Id at 23.
69. Id at 25. "In enacting the Taylor Law, New York State made a determination that in
order to protect the public it must assure the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions
of government by prohibiting strikes by public employees."
70. Id at 26-27. The court used two grounds to distinguish a passenger rail service from a
common freight carrier. First, the court classified the LIRR as a service that state and local gov-
ernments are particularly suited to provide because of community-wide need: "it is a service they
have come to provide by a process of economic elimination of private suppliers." Id at 27. Sec-
ond, the court compared the importance of the LIRR's passenger service to a state operated
freight line. Id See also Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979)
(municipal airport is an integral function of city government); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 736, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212-13 (Sup. Ct. 1956), af d 3 A.D.2d 740, 161
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957).
71. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(federal regulation will be upheld if federal interest is "demonstrably greater" than the state's
interest). See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
72. 634 F.2d at 24.
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merce,73 any analysis that focuses exclusively on the existence of an
impact on interstate commerce appears unjustified. The proper focus
should be on whether the commuter-freight system has sufficient deal-
ings involving interstate commerce to warrant classification as a com-
mon carrier under the RLA.
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether state-
run commuter lines are immune from federal labor regulation. In two
pre-Usery decisions related to this issue, the Court refused either to
enjoin a strike by employees of a private company or to permit the
States to operate a private utility when a labor strike threatened the
utility's continued operation.
In Amalgamated Association of Street Employees, Division 988 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board74 the union challenged the
constitutionality of the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law.75
That statute prohibited employees of private transit companies from
engaging in strikes that would interrupt an "essential public utility
service." 76 The Court held that the statute conflicted with the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and was therefore invalid under the
supremacy clause.77 The Court rejected the Board's argument that a
state statute that affected a private company operating in interstate
commerce and that also conflicted with federal labor legislation could
be saved merely by designating it as "'emergency' legislation." 78
In Division 1287 of the Amalgamated Association of Street Employ-
ees v. Missouri79 the Supreme Court refused to allow the governor of
73. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
74. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
75. Wis. STAT. § 111.62 (1949).
76. Id The statute provided: "It shall be unlawful for any group of employes [sic] of a
public utility employer acting in concert to call a strike or to go out on strike, or to cause any work
stoppage or slowdown which would cause an interruption of an essential service .... "
77. 340 U.S. at 399. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976).
78. 340 U.S. at 393-96. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court, commented that the
Wisconsin act was not emergency legislation but a comprehensive code for the settlement of labor
disputes between public-utility employers and employees. The act sought to deny a federally
guaranteed right and therefore could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id
It is important to note that the NLRA "cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor
arena." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969).
The Court has held, however, that it can look to the NLRA "for assistance in construing the
Railway Labor Act." Id.
79. 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
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Missouri to invoke the King-Thompson Act.80 The Act defined certain
public utilities as "life essentials of the people" and outlawed strikes in
these industries.81 In denying the state authority to implement this
"gemergency legislation," the Court found that Congress had preempted
the state statute by passing the NLRA.82
The facts of Division 988 and of Division 1287 are analogous to
those in United Transportation Union, in which the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit enjoined a strike by railroad employees.8 3 In
each case the state government acted to prevent a strike by invoking
state law. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
Transportation Union found that the Taylor Law embodied a legisla-
tive policy to protect the public from strikes by public employees.84
Similarly, in Division 988 the Supreme Court found that the Wisconsin
statute was a comprehensive labor code designed to prevent interrup-
tions in "essential" public services.85
Several additional considerations, however, undermine the prece-
dential value of Division 988 and Division 1287. First, in both of these
cases the state sought to regulate a service provided by the private sec-
tor. In United Transportation Union, a governmental agency operated
the transit system on a daily basis in order to implement long-range
state policies. The state legislation in Division 988 and Division 1287
sought only to prevent interruptions of privately operated services that
the state legislature deemed essential.8 6 More importantly, Usery and
the cases following it add a second step to the analysis-a determina-
tion whether the federal statute in question "directly displace[s] the
80. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 295.010 -.210 (1969).
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 295.010 (1969) provided:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that heat, light, power, sanitation, trans-
portation, communication, and water are life essentials of the people; that the possibility
of labor strife in utilities operating under governmental franchise or permit or under
governmental ownership and control is a threat to the welfare and health of the people
Mo. REv. STAT. § 295.200 par. 1 (1969) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, employee, or representative as defined in this chapter
to call, incite, support or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to work for any
utility or for the state after any plant, equipment or facility has been taken over by the
state under this chapter, as means of enforcing any demands against the utility or against
the state.
82. 374 U.S. at 82. The Court emphasized that collective bargaining and the right to strike
lay at the heart of the federal labor relations scheme.
83. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. granted, 101
S. Ct. 3107 (1981). See notes 61-72 infra and accompanying text.
84. 634 F.2d at 25.
85. See note 78 supra.
86. In Division 1287, the Court noted that its decision did not affect the states' right to own or
operate a public utility or other business. 374 U.S. at 83.
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State's freedom to structure integral operations. ' 87 In Division 988 and
Division 1287, the Court analyzed the state statutes under the
supremacy clause and did not consider tenth amendment challenges to
the applicability of the federal statutes.
III. PRIOR SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF
STATE-OPERATED FREIGHT RAILROADS
In applying federal labor legislation to state-operated freight rail-
roads, the Supreme Court has implied that a state may waive its Usery
status. In Usery itself the plurality cited with approval88 the case of
United States v. Caifornia,89 in which the Court rejected the state's ar-
gument that its sovereign status precluded the application of federal
railway safety legislation.90 In United States v. Caifornia the Court
held that the State Belt Railroad, though its tracks lay entirely within
the San Francisco area, satisfied all the basic criteria of an interstate
rail carrier.9 ' By engaging in interstate commerce, California "had
subjected itself to the commerce power. '92
In California v. Taylor93 the State Belt Railroad claimed that state
civil service laws protected it from the application of the RLA.94 The
Supreme Court rejected the state's immunity claim, reasoning that
Congress had phrased the RLA's coverage in all-embracing terms. 95
Relying on United States v. Calfornia, the Court emphasized that ex-
87. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
88. Id at 854 n.18 (1976). Justice Rehnquist did, however, dismiss dicta in United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which indicated that states stand on similar footing when chal-
lenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce as "simply wrong." 426 U.S. at 854-
55.
89. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
90. Id at 183. Congress had used its power under the commerce clause to enact the regula-
tion in question, the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-46 (1976).
91. California owned and operated the State Belt Railroad whose tracks paralleled the San
Francisco waterfront. The line served approximately 175 plants, had connections with four inter-
state carriers, and carried traffic bound for other states. 297 U.S. at 181-82. The state emphasized
that it operated the line "without profit, for the purpose of facilitating the commerce of the port,
and [used] the net proceeds of operation for harbor improvements." Id at 183.
92. Id at 185. The Court emphasized that the danger of a defective appliance was as great in
a state-owned railroad as in a privately-owned line.
93. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
94. Id at 559-65.
95. Id at 562-66.
The fact that Congress chose to phrase the coverage of the Act in all-embracing terms
indicates that state railroads were included within it. In fact, the consistent congressional
pattern in railway legislation. . .[has been] to employ all-inclusive language of cover-
age with no suggestion that state-owned railroads were not included.
Id at 564.
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clusion of state employees was inconsistent with the national purpose
of the RLA.96
In Parden v. Terminal Railway97 the Court held that a state waives
its immunity from suit by engaging in activities covered by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA).98 Like the Long Island and State
Belt Railroads, the Terminal Railway served only a small area within
one state, Alabama.99 The Court compared the FELA with the Safety
Appliance' 0° and Railway Labor Acts and determined that state immu-
nity from suit would effectively create a right under the FELA without
a remedy.' 0 ' Alabama argued that under the eleventh amendment, 0 2 a
state cannot be sued without its consent.103 The Court recognized this
principle, but held that the state had consented to potential suits by
engaging in activities subject to congressional regulation. °4
These cases imply that states may consent to some types of federal
regulation by providing services that are subject to congressional regu-
lation under the commerce power. A waiver theory appears appropri-
ate in the context of the eleventh amendment, but seems inappropriate
in determining state amenability to federal regulation under the com-
merce power. The validity of this waiver theory depends on the
strength of the analogy between the states' eleventh amendment immu-
96. 'We can perceive no reason for extending [the presumption that a statute does not
restrict a constituent sovereign state unless it expressly so provides] so as to exempt a
business carried on by a state from the otherwise applicable provisions of an act of Con-
gress, all-embracing m scope and national in its purpose, which is as capable of being
obstructed by state as by individual action.'
Id at 562-63 (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 186 (1936)).
97. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
98. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). FELA section 51 provides that "[eJvery common carrier by
railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States... shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce."
Id. § 51.
99. Alabama wholly owned and operated the Terminal Railway, which served the docks and
several industries in the Mobile area. The line operated as an interchange with several privately
owned railroads. It performed its services for profit under statutory authority authorizing it to
operate "as though it were an ordinary common carrier." ALA. CODE § 33-1-16 (1975) (quoted in
Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 185 (1964)).
100. Ch. 196, 27 Stat. 943 (1893) (codified in scattered sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.), discussed In
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
101. 377 U.S. at 189-90.
102. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment provides that: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
103. 377 U.S. at 186.
104. Id at 190-93. See also Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d
716,720-21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979) (state-operated oil and gas business is not a




nity from Suit,105 and the states' tenth amendment immunity from the
commerce power.10 6 Although the eleventh amendment explicitly ex-
cludes from the judicial power suits against states by citizens of other
states, the Constitution lacks any similarly explicit limitation on the
commerce power. At most, the tenth amendment merely implies an
affirmative limitation on congressional power under the commerce
clause.
From a practical standpoint, a waiver theory could lead to the
anomolous result that some aspects of a state activity may be subject to
regulation while others are not, depending only on whether the activity
began before or after the regulation took effect.10 7 More fundamen-
tally, a waiver theory ignores what should be the essential inquiry in
determining the applicability of federal regulation to the states--the
relative strengths of the state and federal interests involved.10 8 As a
result, the waiver theory is simultaneously too broad and too narrow,
potentially allowing federal regulation where state interests
predominate or forbidding federal regulation when the converse is true.
Such a theory dictates a static view of governmental services, a view the
Supreme Court has condemned.10 9
105. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). See also Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (neither tenth nor eleventh amendment prevents a federal
court from ordering a state agency to reinstate a former employee under the Veteran's Reemploy-
ment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1976), which was passed pursuant to the congressional
war power).
106. See Note, Impact of an Essentiality Test, supra note 11, at 173. Compare U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XI ("The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State") with Id. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people").
107. For example, suppose an unincorporated residential area employs a private security
force. A nearby municipality annexes the area and incorporates the private force into its munici-
pal police department. Federal regulations such as the NLRA and FLSA would cover these
workers while employed in the private sector. If a waiver theory were valid, these regulations
would continue to apply to that division of the municipal police which had constituted the private
force but would not apply to those policemen who had always been employed by the city.
108. See notes 136-41 infra and accompanying text.
109. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See notes 130-35 infra and accom-
panying text.
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IV. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM THE
TAx POWER: BASIS FOR A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
OF USERY PROBLEMS
A. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Tax Immunity Cases.
In attempting to clarify the meaning of an integral state function
in Usery, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the intergovernmental tax
immunity cases provide a useful analogy. 10 Similarities between the
commerce power and the tax power abound. Both are plenary powers
delegated to Congress in article I, section 8 of the Constitution."' Both
are limited only by notions of state sovereignty implied from the tenth
amendment. n 2 Although some writers have criticized the analogy be-
tween the two powers," 3 both Usery and the tax immunity cases ad-
dress the problem of reconciling federal plenary powers with the states'
role in a federal system. Thus, the historic development of a standard
for determining the reach of the federal tax power as applied to state
functions aids in determining limits on the commerce power.
In Collector v. Day" 4 the Court for the first time examined the
limits on the scope of a congressional plenary power as applied to the
states. A Massachusetts probate officer argued that his salary was im-
mune from federal income tax.' 5 He contended that a state judicial
officer is "a means or instrumentality employed to carry into execution
one of [the state's] most important functions, the administration of the
laws."" 6 He then argued that his salary was inseparable from his of-
fice. In refusing to apply the tax, the Court emphasized the importance
of preserving the separate and independent status of states as it existed
110. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1976). See New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) ("[s]urely the power of Congress to lay taxes has impliedly
no less a reach than the power of Congress to regulate commerce.")
I 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
112. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,455 (1978) ("the States' immunity from
federal taxes was judicially implied from the States' role in the constitutional scheme"); National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 843 (1976) (" 'The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares
the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system' ") (quoting Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
113. Compare Note, National League of Cities, Crashes on Takeoff, supra note 11, at 836-39
(examination of tax power cases is "legitimate and useful") with Bogen, supra note 14, at 768-71
(analogy to the tax power is inadequate) and Comment, su.pra note 11, at 165 and Note, New
Approach, supra note 11, at 480-81.
114. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871), overruled, Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466 (1939).
115. 78 U.S. at 122-23.
116. Id at 126.
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at the time of the Constitution's adoption. 1 17 Although the Court later
overruled Day's result, it has never repudiated the decision's underly-
ing concerns.118
In South Carolina v. United States'1 9 the Court introduced the dis-
tinction between proprietary and governmental state functions. In
challenging the applicability of a federal liquor license tax to state li-
quor dealers, South Carolina argued that it was exercising its sovereign
power in operating a liquor business.' 20 The Court upheld the tax, but
in doing so acknowledged that the federal government may not
"prevent a State from discharging the ordinary functions of
government." 121
After considering the implications of extensive public ownership
on the federal tax power, 122 the Court sought to accommodate both the
federal and state interests. In determining which state functions were
immune from the tax power, the Court sought to preserve certain "gov-
ernmental" activities, looking primarily "at the Constitution in the light
of the conditions surrounding at the time of its adoption."' 23 The
Court distinguished these activities from "proprietary" functions, those
services implemented by agencies "which are used by the State in the
117. mhe means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the operations of their
governments, for preserving their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties
assigned to them in the Constitution, should be left free and unimpaired, should not be
liable to be crippled, much less defeated by the taxing power of another government,
which power acknowledges no limits but the will of the leislative body imposing the tax
.... Without this power [to create a judicial department, and the exercise of it, we risk
nothing in saying that no one of the States under the form of government guaranteed by
* the Constitution could long preserve its existence.
Id at 125-26.
118. In overruling Day, the O'Keefe Court found that a tax imposed on a state employee's
salary did not sufficiently burden his function to warrant immunity. Graves v. New York ex rel
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486-87 (1939).
119. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
120. Id at 440-43.
121. Id at 451. Foreshadowing the concern over an unnecessarily restrictive view of state
government later expressed by the Court in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946),
the South Carolina Court recognized the growing movement "in favor of the acquisition and man-
agement by the public of what are termed public utilities, including not merely therein the supply
of gas and water, but also the entire railroad system." 199 U.S. at 454.
122. Obviously, if the power of the State is carried to the extent suggested, and with it is
relief from all Federal taxation, the National Government would be largely crippled in
its revenues. Indeed, if all the States should concur in exercising their powers to the full
extent, it would be almost impossible for the Nation to collect any revenues. In other
words, in this indirect way it would be within the competency of the States to practically
destroy the efficiency of the National Government ....
There is something of a conflict between the full power of the Nation in respect to
taxation and the exemption of the State from Federal taxation in respect to its property
and a discharge of all its functions.
199 U.S. at 455-56.
123. Id at 457.
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carrying on of an ordinary private business."'124 Finding that South
Carolina's liquor business was "proprietary," the Court held that the
federal government could tax the state agents. 125
The Court had difficulty applying the governmental-proprietary
distinction used in South Carolina to subsequent tax immunity cases. 26
Professors Wells and Hellerstein have argued that these cases demon-
124. Id at 461; see id. at 458-63.
[There is a clear distinction as respects responsibility for negligence between the powers
granted to a corporation for governmental purposes and those in aid of private business,
a like distinction may be recognized when we are asked to limit the full power of impos-
ing excises granted to the National Government by an implied inability to impede or
embarrass a State in the discharge of its functions. It is reasonable to hold that while the
former may do nothing by taxation in any form to prevent the full discharge by the latter
of its governmental functions, yet whenever a State engages in a business which is of a
private nature that business is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the Nation.
Id at 463.
125. Id at 463.
126. See, ag., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (tax on New York Port Authority
employees does not place an unconstitutional burden on the states); Allen v. Regents of the Univ.
Sys., 304 U.S. 439, 453 (1938) (federal tax on admission to state university athletic events does not
unconstitutionally burden a state's governmental function: "the immunity implied from the dual
sovereignty by the Constitution does not extend to business enterprises conducted by the States for
gain"); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (salaries of trustees of municipal street railway
held not exempt from federal income tax); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934) (upholding
a tax on state-owned and operated liquor business; in dismissing the state's argument that the
police power is elastic, the Court stated: "[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking customers
it divests itself of its quasi sovereigntypro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned"); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S.
216, 225 (1931) (municipal bond sale held subject to federal tax because there was no "direct
burden" on a government instrumentality and only a "remote" influence on exercise of govern-
ment functions); Metcalf& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 524 (1926) (federal tax applies to state
employees unless the state agency is "of such a character or so intimately connected with the
exercise of a power or the performance of a duty by the one government, that any taxation of it by
the other would be such a direct interference with the functions of government itself as to be
plainly beyond the taxing power").
In Gerhardt the Court held that any constitutional restriction on Congress's taxing power
should be narrowly limited. 304 U.S. at 416. The Court recognized the steady expansion of state
governments into new fields but concluded that the activity in question was not essential to the
preservation of state governmental powers. Id at 416-17, 419. The Court then appeared to bal-
ance the federal and state interests. Id at 419. In attempting to establish guidelines for the bal-
ancing test, Justice Stone argued that the quantitative impact of the tax must be "actual and
substantial, not conjectural." Id at 421. Having concluded that the burden was speculative, he
expressed no opinion about "whether a federal tax may be imposed upon the Port Authority itself
with respect to its receipt of income or its other activities." Id at 424.
In Powers the Court determined that a street railway was not a governmental state function
and applied a balancing test to determine the tax's validity. The trustees argued that the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts had characterized the railway as a "public operation" "under-
taken by the Commonwealth not as a source of profit but solely for the general welfare." 293 U.S.
at 222. Unpersuaded, the Court stated:
We see no reason for putting the operation of a street railway in a different category
from the sale of liquors. In each case, the State, with its own conception of public advan-
tage, is undertaking a business enterprise of a sort that is normally within the reach of
the federal taxing power and is distinct from the usual governmental functions that are
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strate that the governmental-proprietary distinction lacks solid analyti-
cal justification; 127 in their view, the distinction serves as a vehicle to
circumscribe potentially unlimited state immunity.128 Their criticism
centers not on the need for some distinction immunizing certain state
activities from federal regulation, but on the type of distinction chosen
by the Court. 129
In New York v. United States3 o the Court rejected the governmen-
tal-proprietary distinction as a tool to analyze tax immunity problems.
This distinction, Justice Frankfurter wrote, was "too shifting a basis for
determining constitutional power and too entangled in expediency to
serve as a dependable legal criterion." 131 Claiming immunity from a
federal tax on the sale of mineral water, New York argued that its min-
eral water business was "a usual, traditional and essential governmen-
immune from federal taxation in order to safeguard the necessary independence of the
State.
Id at 227.
Post-Usery courts have encountered similar difficulties. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981); Amersbach v.
City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
InAmersbach a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit suggested a four-pronged
test for classifying essential state functions:
(1) The government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is avail-
able to the public at little or no direct expense;
(2) The service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of public service rather than
for pecuniary gain;
(3) Government is the principal provider of the service or activity; and
(4) Government is particularly suited to provide the service or perform the activity
because of a communitywide need for the service or activity.
598 F.2d at 1037.
In Alewine the court found the Amersbach criteria unpersuasive. The district judge suggested
that the first requirement--that the service is available to the public at "little or no direct ex-
pense"--seemed contrary to one of the examples mentioned by the Supreme Court in Usery-
hospitals. The Alewine court, using the synonym "integral operation" for essential function, de-
fined it as one "which the public has come to expect and demand in light of the change of times
and needs of society." 505 F. Supp. at 889.
127. Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 14, at 1083-84.
128. Id.
129. Like the type of distinction that this comment proposes, see notes 136-39 infra and ac-
companying text, the governmental-proprietary distinction used by the Sourth Carolina Court
does not provide blanket protection for any service. Rather, the proposed analysis allows the
Supreme Court to apply a balancing test to determine when an activity is "sufficiently important
to a state's identity to warrant restriction of the Federal taxing power." Id at 1084.
130. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
131. Id at 580 (Frankfurter, J., announcing the judgment of the Court, joined by Rutledge,
J.). Other justices held similar views. Id at 589 (Stone, C.J., concurring, joined by Reed, Mur-
phy, and Burton, J.J.) ("[t]he problem [of tax immunity] is not one to be solved by a formula, but
we may look at the structure of the Constitution as our guide to decision"); id at 591 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Black, J.) ("[a] State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity
whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit").
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tal function."' 3 2 In rejecting this claim, the court found that the
governmental-proprietary distinction unjustifiably and artificially cur-
tailed the federal taxing power.133
The justices' analyses, however, suggest that they rejected only this
particular distinction, not the general need for some distinction mea-
suring the susceptibility of various state functions to federal taxation.
All members of the Court agreed that the taxability of a state activity
should not depend solely on whether it was conducted by the states in
1787: "Such a static concept of government denies its essential na-
ture." 134 But six justices agreed that some state activities were not im-
mune from the federal tax power. 135
B. A Proposed Analytical Framework.
The tax-immunity cases suggest a balancing formula in which the
historic nature of the governmental function plays an important but not
decisive role cases. When a federal tax (or the exercise of federal
power under the commerce clause) interferes with a governmental
132. Id at 574.
133. Id at 583-84 ("we reject limitations upon the taxing power of Congress derived from
such untenable criteria as 'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of the States, or histori-
cally sanctioned activities of government or activities conducted merely for profit, and find no
restriction upon Congress to include the States in levying a tax exacted equally from private per-
sons upon the same subject matter") (footnote omitted); id at 589 (Stone, C.J., concurring, joined
by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.) ("Itihe national taxing power would be unduly curtailed if the
State, by extending its activities, could withdraw from it subjects of taxation traditionally within
it').
134. Id at 579 (Frankfurter, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (remarking on "the
vast extension of the sphere of government, both State and National, compared with that with
which the Fathers were familiar. It could hardly remain a satisfactory constitutional doctrine that
only such State activities are immune from federal taxation as were engaged in by the States in
1787"). See also Id at 588-90 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Stone suggested that the
nature and extent of the state activity in question were not the determinative considerations and
explicitly recognized the utility of a balancing formula. Id at 589-90. Justice Douglas, dissenting,
argued that the states, by undertaking the activity, had removed the project from the scope of the
tax power.
A State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional,
or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit. A State may deem it as essential to
its economy that it own and operate a railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does
to own and operate bridges, street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have
been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state
activities may today be deemed indispensable.
Id at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.) (citations omitted).
135. Id at 575-80, 582 (Frankfurter, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). But see Id at
586 (Stone, CJ., concurring) ("we are not prepared to say that the national government may
constitutionally lay a non-discriminatory tax on every class of property and activities of State and
individuals alike"). In his dissent Justice Douglas argued that the federal government should not
tax any state governmental activity. Id at 590-98 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
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function that was exercised in 1787,136 the federal government ordina-
rily bears a heavy burden of showing that the interference is necessary
to the federal taxation scheme or that it does not unduly interfere with
the state function.1 37 When, however, the federal tax burden falls on a
governmental activity instituted after the drafting of the Constitution,
such as the sale of mineral water, the state has the burden of showing
that the federal tax amounts to "undue interference."13 8 In determin-
ing whether a federal regulation under either the tax or commerce
power is an "undue interference," the court must consider the impor-
tance of the activity to the state and the degree to which the federal
regulation frustrates that activity. 139
This proposed framework uses terminology similar to that used on
different occasions by the Supreme Court. 40 Unlike the Court's vari-
ous renditions, however, this framework assigns distinct meanings to
the terms "traditional" and "essential" and uses the terms consistently.
Furthermore, by considering more than merely whether a state func-
tion is traditional, this framework averts the "static concept of govern-
ment" criticized by the Court. 141
The result reached by the court in the most recent tax immunity
case, Massachusetts v. United States,142 is in accord with this analytical
framework. Massachusetts claimed immunity from a registration tax
136. The reason for attaching significance to the year the Constitution was drafted is that the
government functions performed by the states on that date are most clearly those which the fram-
ers intended to insulate from federal interference. See id. at 579; South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437, 457-58 (1905); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 126 (1871), overruled,
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
137. Cf National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (plurality approach "does not outlaw federal powers in areas.., where the federal interest
is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would
be essential).
138. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 459 (1978).
139. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). The Court has implicitly recognized that
the importance a state attaches to a particular state activity or regulation differs with individual
state policies. Compare id (a Wyoming concrete distributor unsuccessfully challenged a South
Dakota policy which required a state-owned cement plant to sell only the amount of concrete
exceeding in-state demand to out-of-state customers) with Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978)
(Alaska Law requiring that qualified Alaska residents be hired in preference to non-residents held
violative of the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution). In Hicklin the Court also
stated that "the Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's ability to prefer its own citizens in the
utilization of natural resources found within its borders but destined for interstate commerce." Id
at 533.
140. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946).
141. Id.
142. 435 U.S. 444 (1978). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices
White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Concurring in the judgment, Justices Stewart and Powell
found no need to discuss the general contours of state immunity from federal taxation. Id at 470-
71. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at 471.
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on aircraft owned by the state and used exclusively for police func-
tions.' 43 Under the proposed analytical scheme, the federal govern-
ment would bear the burden of proving that the registration tax was
either part of a comprehensive federal scheme or that the tax did not
unduly restrict the state's police activity. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Brennan concluded that Congress regarded the tax "as an integral
and essential part of the network of user charges."144 In discussing the
scope of state immunity from federal taxation, Justice Brennan distin-
guished between taxes imposed on different governmental functions. 145
The proposed framework suggests that to tax traditional activities the
federal government must show that its interest demonstrably exceeds
the state interest. But when the federal government imposes a tax on
an essential state function, the state bears the burden of proving undue
interference with state activity.1 46 Applying the "'practical construc-
tion' that the Court now gives to the limitation the existence of the
states constitutionally imposes on the national taxing power,"'147 Justice
Brennan concluded that the increased cost imposed by the registration
tax did not unduly interfere with Massachusetts's activity.148
V. INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY UNDER THE COMMERCE
POWER: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF
STATE ExEMPTION FROM THE SHERMAN
ANTITRUST ACT
The Supreme Court's treatment of state immunity from the Sher-
man Antitrust Act 49 illustrates the concept of a shifting burden of
proof as well as the role of statutory interpretation in applying a federal
143. Id at 446. Congress imposed the registration tax on all civil aircraft that fly in the navi-
gable airspace of the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 4491 (1976).
144. 435 U.S. at 451. Justice Brennan noted that the registration tax was "the only tax im-
posed on those general noncommercial aircraft owned and operated by States." Id at 452.
145. As the contours of the principle [of state immunity] evolved in later decisions, 'co-
gent reasons' were recognized for narrowly limiting the immunity of the States from
federal imposts. The first is that any immunity for the protection of state sovereignty is
at the expense of the sovereign power of the National Government to tax. Therefore,
when the scope of the States' constitutional immunity is enlarged beyond that necessary to
protect the continued ability of the States to deliver traditional governmental services, the
burden of the immunity is thrown upon the National Government without any corresponding
promotion of the constitutionaly protected values.
Id at 456 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
146. The Court "has recognized that some generic types of revenue measures could never
seriously threaten the continued functioning of the States and hence are outside the scope of the
implied tax immunity." Id at 460.
147. Id. at 459.
148. Id at 467-69.
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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statute to a particular state function. 150 In Parker v. Brown15 1 the
Supreme Court held that federal antitrust law did not preempt a Cali-
fornia statute that established a regulatory mechanism allowing local
raisin growers to maintain prices "so as to restrict competition among
the growers."' 52 The Court assumed that the activity the California
statute allowed would violate the Sherman Act if it were an undertak-
ing by private parties rather than by the state of California. 53 Never-
theless, the Court upheld the statute, finding that Congress intended the
Sherman Act not to apply to action directly involving a state's regula-
tory machinery. 5 4 Apparently, the Court assumed that Congress could
have made the Act applicable to such state action. 155
The Parker Court's inquiry differs from that of the Usery Court in
an important respect. The Parker Court examined whether the specific
action attacked was an official act of the state.' 56 The Usery Court asks
additionally whether the federal regulation forces "directly upon the
states [Congress's] choices as to how essential decisions regarding the
conduct of integral govenmental choices are to be made."' 57 The
Parker Court never reached this question.
In Parker the Court emphasized that the history of the state func-
tion involved was relevant in determining whether the state activity fell
within the purview of the Sherman Act. Citing Northern Securities Co.
v. United States,158 the Parker Court reasoned that states could not
sanction a private price-fixing agreement. In Northern Securities the
petitioners had argued that their corporate acts were immune from the
150. See generally Davidson & Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on
the Federal Interdiction ofAnticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575 (1978); Slater, Anti-
trust and Government Actiorn A Formulafor Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71
(1974); Comment, The Erosion ofState Action Immunityfrom the Antitrust Laws: City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 165 (1978); Note, FederalAntitrust
Immunity: Exposure ofMunicipalities to Treble Antitrust Damages Sets Limitfor New Federalism:
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 11 CONN. L. REv. 126 (1978); Comment, Na-
tional League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine: The Status ofState Sovereignty Under the Com-
merce Clause, 8 FORDHAM UP,. LJ. 301 (1980).
151. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
152. Id at 346.
153. Id at 350.
154. Id at 350-52. "There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's
legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act
declared that it prevented only 'business combinations."' Id at 351 (citations omitted). But see
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394-97 (1978) (discussed at notes
177-90 infra and accompanying text).
155. 317 U.S. at 350-51. See Comment, The Status ofState Sovereignty, supra note 150, at
313.
156. 317 U.S. at 350-52.
157. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
158. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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Sherman Act because their acts were consistent with their state corpo-
rate charter.1 59 In rejecting this defense, Justice Harlan implicitly bal-
anced the federal interest embodied in the Sherman Act against the
state's traditional interest in chartering corporations.1 60
In determining that certain state activities are not prohibited by
the Sherman Act, the Parker Court cited with approval Lowenstein v.
Evans.'6' The Lowenstein court held South Carolina's liquor monop-
oly exempt from antitrust legislation and observed:
The state is a sovereign having no derivative powers, exercising its
sovereignty by divine right.... It has bound itself by compact with
the other sovereign states not to exercise certain of its sovereign
rights, and has conceded these to the Union, but in every other re-
spect it retains all its sovereignty which existed anterior to and in-
dependent of the Union. 162
A comparison of Lowenstein and South Carolina v. United
States 63 illustrates the importance in an Usery analysis of the scope of
the federal statute in question. In Lowenstein the court implicitly
found that the Sherman Act was not intended to regulate essential state
activities that actively involve the state. In South Carolina v. United
States the Court held that the application of a federal tax to state
agents engaged in the sale of liquor did not "impede or embarrass a
State in the discharge of its functions."' The Court inferred that Con-
gress's comprehensive approach to levying the tax evinced a strong fed-
eral interest and this inference played a key role in determining the
statute's applicability to the state function. The comparison thus sug-
gests that a definitional approach to determining the state activities that
Congress can preempt does not suffice; the Court must balance the state
interest in providing a particular service and the federal interest in reg-
ulating that service.
The Parker Court's analysis comports with that of the proposed
Usery framework, which would shift the burden of proving a Sherman
Act exemption to the state that attempts to protect essential, as opposed
to traditional, governmental activities. Chief Justice Stone, writing for
the majority, distinguished a state statute that merely permits private
anticompetitive behavior from a state statute that actively involves the
state in impairing the Sherman Act policy of promoting a free market
159. Id. at 344-45.
160. Id at 345-52.
161. 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
162. Id at 911.
163. 199 U.S. 437 (1905). See notes 119-25 supra and accompanying text.
164. 199 U.S. at 463.
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economy. 65 The Sherman Act preempts the former state statute, but
permits the latter as a sovereign governmental decision.' 66 Some tradi-
tional state activities, such as economic regulation, 67 escape the Sher-
man Act because the Act is not based on a demonstrably greater
federal interest in regulating this type of state activity.
Subsequent antitrust decisions involving the Parker doctrine also
support the use of the two-tiered analysis proposed in this comment. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 168 the Court held the federal antitrust
provisions applicable to a minimum fee schedule for lawyers published
by a county bar association and recommended by the state bar.169 The
Court recognized the state's traditional function of regulating the bar.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the federal interest in the Sherman
Act was demonstrably greater than the state's interest in the fee sched-
ule. 170 The Court's analysis indicates that traditional state activities do
not receive blanket protection from federal regulation; rather, these
state functions are rebuttably beyond the purview of federal regulation.
In Bates v. State Bar171 the Supreme Court upheld against an anti-
trust challenge a disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers. 172
165. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943). The Court noted that the California pro-
gram involved active state government participation:
It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate program.
Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a prorate
program, approved by the Commission, must also be approved by referendum of produ-
cers, it is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and which
enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy. The prereq-uisite approval of the program upon referendum by a prescribed number of producers is
not the imposition by them of their will upon the minority by force of agreement orcombination which the Sherman Act prohibits. The state itself exercises its legislative
authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application.The required vote on the referendum is one of these conditions.
Id at 352. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978). See also David-
son & Butters, srupra note 150, at 583-84; Handler, The Current A4ttackc on the Parker v. BrownState Action Doctrine, 76 COLnM. L. Ruv. 1, 14-15 (1976).
166. 317 U.S. at 352.167. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Court observed:
I~t has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its
first colonization, [for the sovereign] to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bak-
ers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to
be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold.
Id a't 125.
168. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).169. Although the Farfax County Bar Association was a purely voluntary association, the
state bar was an administrative agency through which the state supreme court regulated the prac-
tice of law in the state. Id at 776-78. The United States Supreme Court could not identify any
state statute or state supreme court rule sanctioning the fee schedule. id at 790.
170. Id at 79 1-93.
171. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
172. After rejecting the petitioners' antitrust claims, the Court held that the disciplinary rule
vIolated their first amendment rights. Iad at 363-84.
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The Court determined initially that the petitioners' claim was an attack
on the state supreme court, not on a private party. 173 Distinguishing
Goldfarb, Justice Blackmun viewed the Bates disciplinary rule as a
"clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional be-
havior."' 74 He also emphasized the state's interest in regulating attor-
ney conduct and the historic position of attorneys as officers of the
court.' 75 The degree of the state's involvement in regulating the attor-
neys' conduct distinguishes Bates from Goldfarb; the federal interest
remained unchanged. The Court thus seemed to apply a two-tiered
balancing test in determining whether "federal policy is being unneces-
sarily and inappropriately subordinated to state policy."'1 76
Both the plurality opinion and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 177 reach a result
consistent with the proposed analytical framework. In City of Lafay-
ette Louisiana had granted two municipalities authority to own and
operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their city lim-
its.178 The municipalities brought an antitrust action against the Loui-
siana Power & Light Company. When the power company
counterclaimed for relief from alleged antitrust violations by the mu-
nicipal utilities, the cities argued that the Parker doctrine rendered fed-
eral antitrust laws inapplicable to them. 179
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, rejected the cities' claim
of immunity. Justice Brennan initially examined the Sherman Act's
purpose and concluded that Congress intended the Act's definition of
"persons" to include both cities and states.'80 He then stated that the
Court might treat cities less favorably than states in determining their
immunity from federal law.181 Unless the state specifically authorizes
the city to engage in activity that will violate the Sherman Act, 8 2 a city
cannot invoke the Parker doctrine. 8 3 In City of Lafayette the cities
173. Id at 361.
174. Id at 362.
175. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
176. 433 U.S. at 362. But see Davidson & Butters, supra note 150, at 594-95.
177. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
178. Id at 391.
179. Id at 392-94.
180. Id at 394-97. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942) ("[n]othing in the [Sher-
man] Act, its history, or its policy, could justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in
§ 7 as to exclude a State").
181. 435 U.S. at 397-404.
182. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (active state involvement is necessary to
exempt private activity from Sherman Act's coverage).
183. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978); one possible
justification for this distinction is that municipalities derive their power from the state. See
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
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were unable to make this showing.
In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger expressly recog-
nized the constitutional issue raised by the city's exemption argument.
Using the governmental-proprietary terminology rejected by the Court
in New York v. United States,18 4 the Chief Justice framed the issue as
"whether the Sherman Act reaches the proprietary enterprises of mu-
nicipalities."1 85 Citing both commerce and tax power cases 86 and em-
phasizing the comprehensiveness of the federal antitrust scheme, 8 7 the
Chief Justice concluded that "the running of a business enterprise [an
electric utility] is not an integral operation in the areas of traditional
government functions."' 88 Consequently, he found that this kind of
municipal activity was not exempt from the Sherman Act.
Under the proposed analysis, the municipalities would have failed
to prove that the state interest in providing electricity exempt from
Sherman Act restrictions was demonstrably greater than the federal in-
terest of promoting economic competition without municipal interfer-
ence. Justice Brennan, in City of Lafayette, noted the "serious
economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their
own parochial interests above the Nation's economic goals reflected in
the antitrust laws."' 89 The antitrust laws, moreover, form a compre-
hensive federal scheme: "Congress, exercising the full extent of its con-
stitutional power, sought to establish a regime of competition as the
fundamental principle governing commerce in this country."' 90
184. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
185. 435 U.S. at 422. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W.
4144, 4147 (U.S., Jan. 13, 1982) (No. 80-1350).
186. 435 U.S. at 422-24 (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (dis-
cussed at notes 21-42 supra and accompanying text); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)
(discussed at notes 97-104 supra and accompanying text); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957)
(discussed at notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936) (discussed at notes 89-92 supra and accompanying text); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360
(1934) (discussed in note 126 supra)).
187. 435 U.S. at 424-26.
188. Id at 424.
189. d. at 412-13.
190. Id. at 398. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944) ("[l]anguage more comprehensive is difficult to conceive. On its face it shows a carefully
studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in business whose activities might
restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the states").
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VI. APPLYING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO THE LABOR
RELATIONS OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED AND OPERATED
COMMUTER RAIL SYSTEMS
Analysis under the proposed framework of the labor problems in-
volved in state-operated commuter-freight rail systems indicates that
state governments cannot preempt federal labor legislation. Although
some courts have asserted that such rail systems perform a local service
and do not affect interstate commerce, 191 the adoption of the Urban
Mass Transportation Act (UMTA) 192 in 1964 demonstrates that the
problems of mass transit systems are national in scope. Congress
adopted the UMTA in response to the realization that "the welfare and
vitality of urban areas [and] the satisfactory movement of people and
goods within such areas" depend on mass transportation. 93 In enact-
ing the legislation, Congress rejected the argument that "mass transpor-
tation problems are 'local' and should be a local responsibility."' 194
In adopting the UMTA Congress also expressed its concern that
transit employees retain the same bargaining rights under public own-
ership that they enjoyed under private ownership. Section 13(a) of the
UMTA requires the Secretary of Transportation to provide funds to a
local public body or agency only after a determination by the Secretary
of Labor that "fair and equitable arrangements are made. . . to pro-
tect the interests of employees affected by such assistance."'' 95 One
191. E.g., United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted
101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981); Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. IBEW, Local 922, 57
A.R.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773, appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 934 (1977).
192. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1976).
193. Id § 1601(a)(2).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-4, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEws 2569-2572. The House Report also noted: "Mass transportation needs have outstrip-
ped the present resources of the cities and States, and a nationwide program can substantially
assist [these] problems.... 7he continued economic vitality and growth of our urban areas Is essen-
tial to our national welfare." Id at 4, [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2573 (emphasis
added). But see id at 22-23, 25-26, [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2590-2593 (minority
views).
195. 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976). Several courts have addressed the related issue of whether a
federal court may enjoin a state government from breaching the provisions of a section 13(c)
agreement. Most courts have found jurisdiction to rest in the federal, not the state, judiciary. See
Local Div. No. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1,
13-14 (1st Cir. 1978); Local Div. 519, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Mun. Transit Util.,
585 F.2d 1340, 1349-50 (7th Cir. 1978); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas
City Area Transp. Auth., 582 F.2d 444, 450 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979);
Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 485 F. Supp. 856,
862 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Division 1212, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Chattanooga Area Regional
Transp. Auth., 483 F. Supp. 37, 38-39 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). The UMTA's legislative history also
evinces congressional concern over preserving collective bargaining rights for employees of pub-
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commentator has argued, however, that subsequent UMTA amend-
ments not affecting section 13(a) have been "increasingly emphatic in
[their] recognition of the essential [ie., not subject to federal regulation]
nature of transportation."' 196 Nevertheless, the purpose of the UMTA
demonstrates that commuter rail systems involve national problems
and that their labor problems are subject to the commerce power. 197
The comprehensiveness of the Railway Labor Act' 98 also implies
that the labor problems of lines providing both commuter and freight
services present national problems. The RLA establishes a procedure
for resolving labor disputes involving railroad workers. 199 On numer-
ous occasions the Supreme Court has interpreted this scheme as all-
embracing in scope and national in purpose.200
The RLA expressly excludes from its coverage "street, interurban,
or suburban electric railway[s]."20' Given the Court's broad interpreta-
tion of the RLA, however, the statute's inclusion of "all carriers" 20 2
probably covers lines providing both freight and commuter services.
One example of the Court's broad interpretation of the RLA is the
holding that the RLA covers state-owned freight lines.203 In so holding
the Court noted that Congress did not differentiate between privately-
licly acquired transit systems. H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16, [1964] U.S. CODE
CONo. & AD NEws 2569, 2583-84. But see Adams v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., No. 79-
2059-S (D. Mass., Dec. 24, 1980) (federal jurisdiction improper where subject involved a conflict
between section 13(c) agreement and an amended state law); H.R. REP. No. 204, supra, at 28-29,
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 2595-96.
196. Note, Impact of Essentialiy Test, supra note 11, at 169. See Urban Mass Transportation
Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601a, 1601b (1976).
197. The UMTA does not require that commuter rail employees retain their prior collective
bargaining rights. In Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880, 890 (S.D. Ga. 1981), the court
noted that federal financial backing does not bear on whether an activity is essential. Usery de-
clared that fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, parks and recreation and
school and hospital operations are not subject to the FLSA. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Alewine court observed that the federal government provides
financial assistance for many state services including these services. See 505 F. Supp. at 890. But
see Bogen, supra note 14, at 776-80. See also City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D.
Ga. 1977) (by accepting UMTA funds, local governments may be required under the spending
power to afford collective bargaining rights to employees).
198. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
199. Id §§ 152-160.
200. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380-83
(1969); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957);
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 560-64 (1957).
201. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
202. Id. § 152.
203. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969);
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). Despite these holdings, one commentator has argued
that Congress did not intend to affect the labor relations of systems operating a commuter-freight
line. Note, Impact of Essentiality Test, supra note 11, at 169-70.
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owned and state-owned rail lines and that the effectiveness of the RLA
depends on its application to all rail lines.2°4 The Court has also noted
that state-owned railroads were common when Congress passed the
RLA.20 5 In the Court's view, had Congress intended to exempt state-
owned lines, it would not have chosen to define the Act's scope to in-
clude all railroads.206
The RLA differs from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
which expressly excludes state and local governments from its defini-
tion of covered employers.20 7 In California v. Taylor20 8 the Court dis-
tinguished the NLRA from the RLA on the basis of the former's
exclusion clause and the latter's coverage of all common carriers.20 9
The Court emphasized that the RLA seeks "[t]o avoid any interruption
to commerce. '210
Attempting to explain Taylor as based on the particular carrier's
impact on interstate commerce ignores the broad reach of the com-
merce power.21' Moreover, the proposed analysis suggests that the fed-
eral and state interests involved will determine the RLA's
applicability.212 Thus, the Taylor Court's emphasis on the RLA's com-
prehensiveness, a comprehensiveness that evinces a strong federal in-
terest, supports the application of the RLA to commuter rail systems
that maintain some business in interstate commerce.213
204. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380-82
(1969); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 563-65 (1957).
205. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934); United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 322 (1873).
206. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1957).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) (excluding from coverage "any State or political subdivision
thereof"). In NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600 (1971), the Supreme Court noted that
neither the NLRA nor its legislative history explicitly defines the term "political subdivision." rd
at 604. Finding that the district was an entity "'administered by individuals who are responsible
to public officials,' "the Court concluded that the district was a political subdivision exempt under
the NLRA. Id at 605-09.
208. 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
209. Id at 564.
210. Id at 566 (emphasis added).
211. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
212. See notes 136-39 supra and accompanying text.
213. 353 U.S. at 567-68.
Congress no doubt concluded that a uniform method of dealing with the labor problems
of the railroad industry would tend to eliminate inequities, and would promote a desira-
ble mobility within the railroad labor force.... If California, by engaging in interstate
commerce by rail, subjects itself to the commerce power so that Congress can make it
conform to federal safety requirements, it also has subjected itself to that power so that
Congress can regulate its employment relationships.
Id In the context of rail-safety regulation, the lower courts have disagreed about whether Con-
gress intended to include commuter systems in the Railway Safety Act's coverage, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 421-441 (1976). Compare Chicago Transit Auth. v. Flohr, 570 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1977) (a
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The judicial treatment of state laws under the labor preemption
doctrine provides additional support for concluding that the RLA cov-
ers state employees of commuter-freight lines.214 The Supreme Court
first fully articulated the doctrine that federal labor statutes generally
preempt contrary state laws affecting employee rights in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon.215 Writing for the majority, Justice
Frankfurter expressed the fear that without preemption, state regula-
tion could effectively dismantle "the comprehensive regulation of in-
dustrial relations" formulated by Congress. 216 The potential conflicts
between two law-enforcing authorities and the problem of effectively
administering the federal scheme217 prompted Justice Frankfurter to
conclude:
When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activ-
ity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of indus-
trial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States
from acting....
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,. . . due regard for the federal enactment
requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to
regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regula-
transit system is not a "railroad" subject to Railway Safety Act) with United States v. Massachu-
setts Bay Transp. Auth., 360 F. Supp. 698 (D. Mass. 1973) (a transit system is a railroad subject to
the Act).
In Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 819 v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1977), the court
addressed the related issue of whether federal labor policy preempted a conflicting state subsidiza-
tion program. New Jersey had conditioned its operating subsidies to private transit companies on
their adherence to certain restrictions regarding employee wages. Finding that Congress did not
intend to preclude this type of state action, the court upheld the program. Id at 1029-30. New
Jersey's program, the court opined, constituted proprietary action, not a governmental attempt to
influence the substantive outcome of the bargaining process. Id But see Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 153 (1976) (state may not enjoin
union's refusal to work overtime: "state attempts to influence the substantive terms of collective-
bargaining agreements are... inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme. . ."). One com-
mentator has strongly criticized the Byrne decision, noting the impact of the state's interference
with working conditions and its psychological effect on the workers. Comment, Labor Preemption
and State Subsidized Industries, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1332, 1337-39 (1978). The court failed to
recognize its decision's implications on federal labor policy. The magnitude of state spending in
the private sector creates an enormous potential for altering or even dictating private sector labor
contract provisios-"a result clearly at odds with federal labor policy." Id 1338-39. Admittedly,
the state had an interest in providing transportation services to its constituents at the lowest possi-
ble cost. Nevertheless, the commentator argues, New Jersey could have chosen to provide these
services itself and to utilize the NLRA exemption of state employers. See id. 1343.
214. Seegeneraly Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Note,
The Preemption Doctrine: ShJiing Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L.
Rlv. 623 (1975); Note, 4 Frameworkfor Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
215. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
216. Id at 239.
217. Id at 242-43.
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tion involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted
by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. . . . Regard-
less of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct
which is the subject of national regulation would create potential
frustration of national purposes.21 8
The Garmon Court did not prohibit states from regulating conduct
"so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence
of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress
had deprived the States of the power to act. ' 219 Consequently, the
Court did not overrule the line of cases preserving state jurisdiction to
maintain domestic peace during labor disputes.220
The proposed framework explains the results of some labor pre-
emption cases.221 When states regulate nontraditional interests, the
federal statutory scheme generally preempts state regulation. To avoid
preemption, however, a state must show that its interest is demonstra-
bly greater than the federal interest. In New York Telephone Co. v. New
York State Department ofLabor222 the Court upheld a state statute that
provided unemployment compensation to strikers, even though the
statute undoubtedly affected the collective bargaining process. The
Court found no evidence in the NLRA of congressional intent to deny
a state the power to enact an unemployment compensation system.223
The proposed analysis would classify this state activity as essential and
would find it protected in view of the demonstrably greater state inter-
est in a comprehensive unemployment compensation scheme than the
federal interest in precluding the scheme.2 24
Under the proposed analysis, a commuter-freight rail service is an
essential state function. Consequently, to avoid application of the
RLA, the state must prove that its interest in providing these services is
demonstrably greater than the federal interest embodied in the RLA.
218. Id at 243-44.
219. Id at 244.
220. Id at 247. See also International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (state
court jurisdiction over common law tort action against union for mass picketing and threats of
violence upheld); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state court may enjoin conduct
of striking employees that is likely to promote violence); International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin
Employees Relation Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (state labor relations board may enjoin violent union
conduct); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (state court
jurisdiction over common law tort action against union upheld).
221. See Note, A Framework, supra note 214, at 372-89.
222. 440 U.S. 519 (1979). See generally Comment, New York Telephone v. New York State
Department of Labor- Limiting the Doctrine of Implied Labor Law Pre-emption, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 297 (1980); Comment, Balancing in Labor Law Preemption Cases: New York Telephone Co.
v. New York State Department of Labor, 32 STAN. L. REv. 827 (1980).
223. 440 U.S. at 540-46.
224. See notes 136-39 supra and accompanying text.
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The federal interest in the RLA is particularly strong. In Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,225 the
Supreme Court, for example, refused to allow a state to regulate the
economic combat between parties subject to the RLA. Finding that
employees have the right to strike under the RLA,226 the Court held
that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving that the regula-
tion of peaceful picketing did not interfere with the RLA.227
In assessing the state's interest in providing commuter-freight serv-
ices, a court should examine the nature of the service rather than the
label assigned to it by the state government. Thus, the MTA's attempt
in United Transportation Union to avert a threatened strike by con-
verting the LIRR into a "public benefit corporation" bears only on
whether the LIRR is facially subject to the Taylor law.228 Under the
proposed analysis this action does not remove the line from the con-
straints of the RLA and the Supreme Court should find that the state
interest in providing this non-traditional service does not demonstrably
outweigh the federal interest in the RLA.
Admittedly, under the proposed analysis, the RLA covers employ-
ees of rail systems in which the state maintains or provides freight serv-
ices but would exempt employees if the state were to discontinue
freight operations. This conclusion, however, results from the RLA's
specific exclusion of commuter lines.229 For purposes of the RLA, a
commuter-freight system is a "carrier" within the Act and subject to its
provisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of the rising costs of providing commuter rail services,
state and local governments increasingly have acquired privately
owned companies to provide this service. When these services are
linked to an interstate freight system, the Railway Labor Act provides
the companies' employees with collective bargaining rights. Most
courts addressing the question of whether employees retain these rights
after state acquisition have focused on the "essentiar' nature of the
service. This approach misses the more important question of whether
225. 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
226. 1d at 378-79.
227. Id at 390-93; see id. at 381 ("the potential for confict. . . and for the imposition of
inconsistent state obligations... are simply too great to allow each State which happens to gain
personal jurisdiction over a party to a railroad labor dispute to decide for itself what economic
self-help that party may or may not pursue").
228. See notes 61-72 supra and accompanying text.
229. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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the federal statute can constitutionally cover the particular state
activity.
In answering this last question, the framework proposed in this
comment provides a workable solution for determining whether the
particular state activity is immune from federal regulation. The tax
power and antitrust cases suggest that the tension between two different
law-enforcing bodies may best be resolved by distinguishing initially
between traditional and essential governmental functions. In regulat-
ing traditional governmental functions the federal government must
prove that the federal interest embodied in the statute is demonstrably
greater than the state interest. In cases involving essential governmen-
tal functions the state bears the burden of proving that its interest is
demonstrably greater than the federal interest. These classifications
and the shifting burden of proof provide a workable guide for state and
municipal governments in responding to the changing demands of their
constituents, while preserving Congress's ability under the commerce
power to regulate activities requiring national attention and remedies.
Morris A. Ellison
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